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The Economics of Retirement 
Behavior 
Olivia S. Mitchell, Cornell University 
Gary S. Fields, Cornell University 
This paper examines the role of economic factors in determining 
retirement behavior using a unique new data archive on more than 
8,700 workers covered by 10 different pension plans. We build on 
our earlier work by estimating several different retirement models 
including both linear and discrete choice formulations. This frame- 
work provides new insights into how and why retirement ages differ 
across firms. We conclude that older workers' income opportunities 
differ depending on their pension rules, which in turn have a powerful 
influence on their retirement patterns. In addition, the models in- 
dicate that older workers' tastes for income are not uniform, either 
across individuals or across firms. Finally, we show that retirement 
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age differences are due in part to differences in worker preferences 
and in part to differences in income opportunities. There appears to 
be some evidence of worker sorting across pension plans. 
I. Introduction 
Why do older workers retire when they do? Although some workers 
withdraw from their firms when confronted with health problems or 
mandatory retirement,' an economic explanation, in contrast, puts more 
weight on the role of income and leisure opportunities as determinants 
of older workers' retirement patterns. 
The present paper contains several findings about the role of economic 
factors in retirement behavior, using a unique new data archive on more 
than 8,700 workers covered by 10 different pension plans. It extends our 
earlier work based on 390 workers in a single pension plan (Fields and 
Mitchell 1983a; Mitchell and Fields 1983). The point of departure in 
Section II is an intertemporal model in which older individuals select a 
retirement age from among several possible dates by comparing the utility 
from each alternative. Empirical implementation of this framework re- 
quires modeling expectations about future pension and earnings treams. 
We do this in Section III. In Section IV, various retirement models are 
estimated, including both linear and discrete choice formulations. We test 
for unobservable but systematic patterns in workers' preferences for in- 
come relative to leisure, and evaluate the sensitivity of estimated responses 
to changes in income parameters. We take a different tack in Section V, 
exploring how and why average retirement ages differ across firms. This 
last issue has received only scant attention in existing literature, though 
it is critical in determining whether or not workers "sort" themselves 
into firms providing pension plans rewarding early or late retirement. 
Results and policy implications are gathered in Section VI. We con- 
clude: (1) older workers' income opportunities differ depending on when 
they retire, who they are, and what their pension rules are; (2) differences 
in income opportunities at older ages influence retirement patterns sig- 
nificantly; (3) older workers' tastes for income and leisure are not uniform 
either across older workers within a firm or across firms; and (4) average 
retirement ages vary widely across firms; some of this variation is attrib- 
utable to differences in worker preferences, and some to differences in 
income opportunities. In addition, we find some evidence of worker 
sorting. 
I Gordon and Blinder (1980) provide a careful analysis of the role of poor health 
in retirement; a recent review of how health affects older workers is contained 
in Bazzoli (1983). Lazear (1979) has an interesting analysis of mandatory retire- 
ment policy. 
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II. Modeling Constraints and Choices 
A. The Theoretical Framework 
The basic model of how earnings, private pensions, and social security 
benefit streams affect workers' retirement ages is facilitated by examining 
figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts the intertemporal budget set for a worker 
contemplating retirement, taking age 60 (or some similar age) as the 
starting point for retirement planning and the planning horizon as T years. 
Each year the individual continues to work, he receives $Et in after-tax 
earnings. If he retires in year R, he receives $ir(R) in retirement income 
from private pension and social security in that year and $P(R, t) in 
retirement income thereafter.2 The upward slope of the ir function reflects 
the widespread practice of providing higher initial benefits to a worker 
who defers retirement. Corresponding to each retirement date (e.g., R, 
and R2) are streams of future pension benefits, denoted by P(R, t). The 
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2 This paper equates the date of retirement with pension acceptance and labor 
force withdrawal, which proves to be an accurate description of most older work- 
ers' behavior in later life. For a discussion of partial retirement, see Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1981). 
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P(R, t) functions are flat if pension streams are constant over time; they 
rise if postretirement pension increases are awarded. 
The monetary gain to continued work is best treated in terms of present 
discounted values. Let at be a discount factor reflecting time preference 
and mortality. The present discounted value of earnings is 
PDVE = JEttdt. (1) 
This increases with length of work life R so long as Et > 0. The pension 
structure rewards or discourages continued work in accordance with 
PDVP = f(PPt + SSt)btdt. (2) 
When retirement is postponed, pension benefits typically are higher per 
year, but they are received for fewer years. If PDVP(R) is constant re- 
gardless of the date of retirement, the pension structure is said to be 
actuarially neutral. Generally, however, neither private pensions nor so- 
cial security is neutral in this sense. The total payoff from working until 
a particular age and then retiring is the sum of PDVE and PDVP: 
PDVY =A Et~tdt + (PPt + Sst)btdt. (3) 
The earnings and pension streams depicted in figure 1 produce a PDVY 
locus which increases monotonically in R. 
The choice of retirement age is determined by combining this inter- 
temporal budget set with an intertemporal utility function, here postu- 
lated to have as its arguments present discounted value of expected lifetime 
income (PDVY, as given by [3]) and number of leisure years (RET = T 
- R).3 The control variable R is selected to maximize 
U = U(PDVY, RET), (4) 
where U., U2 > 0, U.,, U22 < 0 subject to (3). As shown in figure 2, the 
goal is to achieve the highest possible utility level U", consistent with the 
intertemporal budget set. The optimal retirement date R-" equates the 
marginal utility of income from an additional year of work with the 
marginal utility of one more year of leisure. 
3 In empirical work below, RET was set equal to the difference between average 
life expectancy for males in that cohort (75.6 years) and the retirement age in 
question. 
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B. Econometric Formulations 
Two different econometric models are used in the present paper to 
determine mpirically how responsive retirement ages are to changes in 
the budget constraint. 
The first approach takes the age of retirement as the dependent variable 
and estimates its sensitivity to a parameterization of the intertemporal 
budget set. In particular, we postulate that the PDVY function in figure 
2 may be summarized by two variables: (1) base wealth (YBASE), or the 
present value of income available at the earliest possible retirement age; 
and (2) the gain in the present value of income that would be obtained 
by working longer and postponing retirement (YSLOPE). In earlier work 
(Fields and Mitchell 1983a) we showed theoretically that the age of re- 
tirement should be negatively related to YBASE, ceteris paribus, because 
of the ordinary negative income effect. YSLOPE, on the other hand, has 
a theoretically ambiguous effect on the age of retirement; a higher income 
gain from postponing retirement makes the worker's leisure time more 
costly (inducing more work) but also provides higher income each year 
he does work (inducing earlier retirement). If the substitution effect dom- 
inates, the partial effect of YSLOPE on the age of retirement should be 
positive. These hypotheses are tested in Section IV. 
While the OLS model is invaluable as a first-round approach to the 
age of retirement problem, it is also useful to determine what further 
insights are obtained from a more structured econometric procedure. An 
approach that proved fruitful in our earlier study of workers in a single 
firm (Mitchell and Fields 1983) is to model retirement in a discrete choice 
framework. Drawing on the pathbreaking work of McFadden (1974), we 
postulate that the ith worker would receive utility U1j if he retired at age 
j, where utility is composed of a "strict utility" component for the average 
person and a disturbance term which varies across people: 
Uij = (ox log PDVYj + 13 log RET) + Eij. (5) 
Here ox and 3 are average taste parameters to be estimated across a sample 
of individuals. 
To close the model, we must add a distributional ssumption about the 
E 's. A common tactic in qualitative choice analysis is to assume that E 1's 
are distributed independently of one another and that each Eij has the 
Weibull distribution. This produces a conditional multinomial logit model 
(MNL): 
eU(i 
Pij = ij 
(6 
Ee M 
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As is well known, however, this distributional assumption requires 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA); that is, the relative prob- 
abilities of any two choices are unaffected by the attributes or availability 
of other choice options. In particular, IIA means that there is no cor- 
relation between E.k and Eij (k * A). However, in the retirement context 
there is strong reason to believe that such correlation may be important- 
particularly ifindividuals are likely to be "workaholics" or "leisure lovers." 
In order to allow for this kind of correlation, we propose a conditional 
ordered logit (OL) setup, in which the probability of choosing a given 
retirement age is allowed to depend on the attractiveness of the next closest 
retirement ages.4 The probability of selecting from among several ordered 
choices may be approximated as 
e vi + erNj 
pi 
= K (7) 
E, (e Vk + (rNk) 
k =-1 
where NA - - 1/2 [log (1/2) + log(1 + P ?? ,/Pj?) + log(1 + PO,+ /IPj?)] and 
PO is the probability of selecting retirement age k under the IIA assump- 
tion. Nj plays the role of a proxy for alternative-specific variation in tastes, 
which otherwise would be omitted from the logit model; its coefficient 
(a) indicates the importance of such variation. Iterated maximum like- 
lihood estimation produces estimates of the coefficients of interest, re- 
ported in Section IV. 
C. Data 
As is evident from the previous discussion, estimating retirement models 
requires that the analyst have complete information for each sample in- 
dividual about (1) the actual retirement age he selected and (2) the inter- 
temporal budget set he faced. 
Concerning the actual retirement age, many data sets deal with indi- 
viduals who have not yet retired. Our data set, a subsample of the Benefit 
Amounts Survey developed by the U.S. Department of Labor, avoids 
this difficulty because we include only those individuals who reached the 
age of mandatory retirement by the time of the survey in 1978.5 As a 
result these data are free from "censored spells" problems which plague 
4 This model is developed in more detail in Mitchell and Fields (1983), following 
Small (1981). A multinomial profit model might also be considered as an alter- 
native estimating framework, though empirical implementation of a nine-outcome 
structure is computationally infeasible. 
I Mandatory retirement ages varied across firms in the 1970s; six firms in our 
sample used age 65, one used age 66, and the rest were later or had no compulsory 
withdrawal age. 
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other labor-force modelers. At the same time, we wish to avoid mortality 
bias and thus select the youngest possible group of workers in the sample- 
those born in 1909 and 1910. The data set then consists of 8,733 males 
in 10 firms who retired between the ages of 60 and 68. This is a much 
larger group of workers than used in other studies of retirement patterns, 
and in addition extends the 390-retiree sample used in our own previous 
empirical studies. 
The Benefit Amounts Survey is also exceptionally useful for building 
the components of each worker's intertemporal budget set. This is because 
the data were collected on each worker's years of service, birth year, and 
retirement year, and then the individual files were matched with Social 
Security administrative records and firms' pension rules. The Social Se- 
curity records provided a detailed earnings history for each worker from 
1951 on,6 which was used to compute what each individual would have 
made (after taxes) had he continued to work between the ages 60 and 
68.7 In addition, published Social Security regulations were used to com- 
pute each worker's benefit streams for all possible retirement ages. For 
private pensions, descriptions of benefits rules were taken from union 
contracts and/or summary plan descriptions on file with the Labor De- 
partment, which we rendered computer usable by constructing complex 
benefit algorithms for each of the 10 plans used in the analysis.8 
A final modeling issue concerns the matter of identification. In con- 
ventional cross-section studies of hours of work, the econometrician ob- 
serves a variety of choice outcomes and attributes ome of the variability 
to budget set differences and some to differences in tastes and preferences 
across workers. In contrast, most previous retirement studies have used 
surveys containing no variation in budget sets across workers since all 
employees are covered by social security benefit rules which are uniform 
across the economy at any particular moment in time. In that type of 
data set, differences in behavior are associated with taste differences alone, 
since behavioral responses to budget set changes cannot be measured. 
The present research does not suffer from this problem, however, since 
6 For years in which earnings exceeded the payroll tax ceiling, we imputed 
earnings using a variant of the Fox method (1976). 
7 More information about the construction of the intertemporal budget set is 
available from the authors on request. 
8 Pension descriptions in effect during the 1970s when sample members were 
retiring were complemented with earlier descriptions, used to determine how 
benefits had changed during the previous decade. The empirical analysis below 
builds in preretirement pension increases consistent with what each plan did 
during this period; since most plans did not grant postretirement increases, nom- 
inal benefits on retirement are taken to be constant. The 10 plans in our sample 
cannot be identified individually for confidentiality reasons; however, the sample 
includes four blue-collar plans negotiated by the United Auto Workers and several 
nonunion manufacturing and service sector plans. 
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our data set (described below) surveys workers from several different 
firms covered by different pension plans. Thus the file contains sample 
variation of the sort required to disentangle utility parameters from budget 
sets using the models described above.9 
III. Earnings, Private Pensions, and Social Security 
Benefit Streams 
The income opportunities available to each worker at all feasible re- 
tirement ages are presented in table 1. The perspective taken is a forward- 
looking one: we ask, from the viewpoint of age 60, What is the discounted 
present value of pension benefits, social security income, and earnings 
available to the worker if he were to retire at age 60, or age 61, or later?1O 
We follow standard practice by discounting each year's benefits by the 
probability of mortality at each age, based on survival rate information 
for the cohort. In addition, future benefits are deflated by inflation and 
a real discount rate, assumed to be 2%. 
Several regularities tand out in these data. First, discounted lifetime 
income always increases as retirement isdeferred. This is a result of higher 
cumulative earnings which outweigh any actuarial penalty imposed by 
private pension plans, and the social security penalty when retirement is
deferred past age 65.11 Second, the intertemporal budget set is highly 
nonlinear. On average, a worker postponing retirement from age 61 to 
62 would gain about $8,700, but for delaying retirement between ages 
64 and 65 the worker receives a marginal gain 16% smaller. This arises 
Table 1 
Present Value of Total Income (PDVY) and Its Components for Alternative 
Retirement Ages in 10 Plans 
Retirement Age (Years) Ten-Plan 
Mean: 60 61 62 63 64 65 
PDVE 0 7,472 14,825 22,007 28,981 35,581 
PDVSSt 28,363 29,339 30,256 31,798 33,196 34,265 
PDVPP 22,892 22,759 23,200 22,457 21,717 21,354 
PDVY 51,255 59,570 68,281 76,262 83,894 91,200 
Benefits are computed only until age 65, because some of the sample plans had mandatory retirement 
at that age. 
t Social security benefits are computed assuming the individual retires in the year in question and 
files for benefits when first eligible. 
I In Section V we look at the individuals in specific plans, recognizing that this 
issue could be raised again here. Data on variations in pension structures through 
time would be required to investigate this idea further; such data are not presently 
available. 
10 The computations assume that an individual files for social security when he 
retires or at age 62, whichever is later. 
II Social security rules in effect in the 1980s are somewhat different; see Fields 
and Mitchell (1983b). 
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because of the underlying nonlinearities in the pension and social security 
systems and the interactions between them. Some of our sample plans 
integrate benefits with social security payments, paying "early retirement 
supplemental income" until the retiree is eligible for social security. The 
payoff to deferring retirement is greater for some ages than for others in 
all sample plans. 
Another important feature of the data is that the intertemporal budget 
sets vary substantially across workers. The major source of this variability 
is clear from table 2, which reports means and standard deviations of 
private pension income streams in each of the 10 plans.12 Differences in 
years of service account for much of the variation in expected benefits 
across workers in the pattern plans, where benefits are determined pri- 
marily as a function of tenure at the firm. The conventional plans exhibit 
somewhat more cross-worker variation since they include both service 
and salary history in computing benefits. The fact that there are differ- 
ences across workers' intertemporal budget sets is critical in estimating 
retirement responses, just as it. is necessary to have wage differences in 
order to trace out labor supply patterns in the cross-sectional context. 13 
In addition to within-plan income differences, there are also across- 
plan differences in income opportunities. Because the pension structures 
are quite complex, it is useful to derive expected benefits for the identical 
"illustrative worker" in all 10 plans; the results appear in table 3. One 
striking feature is that the pattern plans in our sample tend to structure 
their benefits o that they actively discourage work beyond age 60.14 A 
pattern plan employee who defers retiring until age 65 will in fact receive 
lifetime pension benefits which are about 18% lower than at age 60. On 
the other hand, conventional plans' present value streams are set up so 
that the worker who defers retirement until age 65 will receive about 
17% higher pension benefits than if he left at age 60. Thus, between ages 
60 and 65, conventional plans improve benefits by about the same pro- 
portion that pattern plans reduce them. In general, pattern plans tend 
to encourage early retirement, while conventional plans encourage re- 
maining on the job until age 62 and offer a flat payout schedule thereafter 
(see fig. 3). We can conclude that in some plans, the present value of 
12 Plan 1 was the subject of analysis in our previous empirical work. Early 
retirement could not be elected prior to age 62 in plan 5, though in principle 
vested benefits could be computed. 
13 Additional differences in workers' intertemporal budget sets arise from earn- 
ings and years of labor market experience. 
14 This pattern is consistent with those observed by Burkhauser (1976, 1979), 
who studied the United Auto Workers, and by Lazear (1983), who examined 
large pension plans surveyed by the Bankers' Trust Company. Kotlikoff and Wise 
(1983) also examine a large sample of plans and conclude that the expected present 
value of vested benefits rises until the company's early retirement age and then 
falls thereafter. 
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retirement income is quite low for an early retiree, but rises if retirement 
is postponed; for other plans, the structure is reversed so that early 
retirement is rewarded most highly and continued work is penalized by 
the pension plan. 
In the next section we explore how these differences in income op- 
portunities across workers and plans influence retirement age decisions. 
IV. Retirement Responses to Income Opportunities 
A. Results from the Linear Model 
Table 4 contains a first set of findings on the question of how earnings, 
pensions, and social security benefits affect retirement patterns. We find 
that the predictions uggested by our previous research are confirmed in 
column 1. The coefficient on YBASE is significantly negative, indicating 
that persons with more base income retire earlier. In addition, the effect 
of YSLOPE is positive, indicating that individuals who have more to gain 
by postponing retirement do in fact retire later. Sixteen percent of the 
variance in retirement ages is accounted for by just these two variables- 
a high R2 for micro data. Thus we conclude that our earlier regression 
findings for the employees covered by one particular pension plan are 
supported in this extended sample. 
PDVY $ Pattern 
5 < _ Conventional 
60 62 65 
FIG. 3 
Table 4 
Retirement Age Regressions for Pooled Sample (N = 8,733) 
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: Age of Retirement 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 64.17- 64.52- 65.40:- 
(748.94) (626.56) (125.71) 
YBASE -.039- -.034: - .103 
(32.71) (24.15) (5.30) 
YSLOPE 30.41 - 29.07- 55.43"- 
(23.60) (22.92) (6.84) 
Intercept dummies 
Slope dummies 
R2 .16 .27 .33 
Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Statistically significant by conventional F-tests. 
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Having established the overall qualitative robustness of the regression 
results, we turn our attention to the specific quantitative magnitudes of 
the regression coefficients to determine whether the workers in the 10 
plans exhibit basically the same quantitative responses to lifetime income 
opportunities. One set of tests is based on the pooled sample. Using all 
8,733 workers, we introduce dummy variables allowing first for plan- 
specific intercept shifters (col. 2) and then also for plan-specific slope 
shifters (col. 3). In both models we see that the plan dummies are sig- 
nificantly different from zero by conventional standards. From this we 
conclude that the workers in different pension plans are differentially 
responsive to economic incentives associated with deferred retirement. 
It might be thought that in addition to the parameters of the budget 
constraint (as measured by YBASE and YSLOPE), variations across firms 
in retirement ages might be associated with differences in demographic 
characteristics of the workers or with characteristics of the firms them- 
selves. Variables to test these conjectures are not abundant in our data 
set; for some plans we did have a few additional descriptors of the workers 
(race, marital status), but these had no significant impact on the findings 
noted above. As for firm-side variables, we were able to develop dummy 
variables measuring the existence of a union, whether all employees were 
blue collar, whether the firm was in the manufacturing sector, and whether 
mandatory retirement prior to age 68 was in effect. When these variables 
are regressed on plan-level coefficient estimates obtained from column 
2 of table 4, we find that unionized firms have somewhat later retirement 
ages and blue-collar workers retire significantly earlier, holding constant 
the budget constraint as measured here. These findings are consistent 
with nonpecuniary attributes of the job playing a role in determining 
retirement ages: in particular, unions may increase the attractiveness of 
the workplace, while blue-collar jobs are less appealing to the older worker. 
Since we cannot yet identify very many of the factors differentiating 
workers' retirement patterns across plans, the only available option is to 
treat these worker and firm traits as unobservables and to develop models 
incorporating unmeasured systematic differences across employees. This 
is accomplished to a great degree by means of the discrete choice models 
explored next. 
B. Results from the Discrete Choice Models 
The jumping-off point for discrete choice modeling is the conditional 
multinomial logit (MNL) model. Because of the potential for differences 
in unobservables across firms ignaled in the previous section, and because 
early mandatory retirement provisions were in effect in some firms but 
not in others, we examine the 10 pension plans one by one rather than 
in a pooled model. Plan-by-plan results for the MNL model appear in 
the left-hand columns of table 5. 
I 
0 
-> 
arso 
o.r 
o 
N
 
Q
Ln 
-O
 
N
 
00 O
N
 
rn 
C 
I 
00 
O
N
 
r 
O
 
N
 
o 
O
0N
o 
) rn o r 
-N
 
00 
~~N
e~-~e~ 
Lf~~ 
ecn 
- 
O
~N
- 
f 
L 
f 
e 
L 
L 
O
 
n 
'I 
n 
0 
N
 
e 
0 
I 
o 
C ) 
so 
?s 
o 6 
C 
I 
I 
YI 
I 
O
 
I 
~-' 
O
N
 
I Ln 
~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~- 
Ln 
U
n 
fn Un 
C 
o) 
f 
N
 
N
 
t 
? N
 
I- 
0o 
;~~~~~" 
a on 
'I 
o 
"o " o 
00 
I O
 
C) 'IC 
C) 
Ln 
I 
CD 
a 
a 
06 
toc6 
o 
m
?O
 
o 
N
 
,n 
CT 
CT 
0 
0 
o 
CT 
N
 
Lfo0N
 
N
 n 
so 
N
 n 
N
O
 
I 
C 
o 
; 
O
 
O
 
O
 
0 
N
 
C) 
141 
N
tN
 
00 
Irn 
U
n CT 
Ln 
"O
 
Ln 
CN
 
"o 
n 
O
N
 
Ln 
-S 
m
? 
. 
. 
1e 
ct? 
U
 ~ 
~ 
If C)O
 
L) 
ro 
ro~~~ 
0 
N
 
t 
s~~~~o 
e 
eo N
U
 
=O
- 
? e -? ........ 
w
H
 
b 
? 
. 
H
 
m
 
98 Mitchell/Fields 
For all 10 plans, the MNL results indicate that the income opportunities 
for different retirement ages (PDVY) are significant determinants of re- 
tirement patterns. In eight of the 10 plans, workers also appear to value 
leisure years (RET) significantly. However, before accepting these find- 
ings based on the MNL model, it is necessary to test the validity of its 
underlying assumption-the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA). 
One test of IIA was suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1981). It 
is a x2 test statistic that compares the estimated MNL coefficients from 
the full sample with new coefficients obtained from estimating an 
MNL model on a subsample of individuals who chose a specific subset 
of alternatives. 15 Such calculations for the subsets age 60 through 65, and 
60 through 62, appear in panel A of table 6. The calculated value of the 
test statistic surpasses the critical value in all but one firm for which the 
test could be performed. 16 This is strong evidence against IIA: tastes for 
leisure are not uniform in the older population.17 
The second IIA test compares the predicted frequency distribution of 
retirement ages under MNL, where IIA is required, with the predicted 
distribution obtained from the ordered logit model, where IIA is relaxed. 
By this test, reported in panel B of table 6, the calculated test statistic 
surpasses the critical x2 value in six of the 10 plans. Thus IIA should also 
be rejected in the majority of the cases by this second test. 
Taken together, these tests suggest that the ordered logit (OL) model, 
in which IIA is not maintained, better suits the retirement problem. An 
examination of the OL coefficient estimates (right-hand columns for each 
plan in table 5) indicates the importance of both income and leisure as 
determinants of retirement ages. PDVY is statistically nonzero in all 10 
plans, and RET enters significantly in eight of 10 plans. The results are 
similar to MNL findings in some cases, for example, the ratio /13 and 
the log-likelihood ratio for plan 8 are virtually identical.18 However, in 
other cases the results are quite different: for plan 5, the ratio /13 changes 
by about 18% and the log-likelihood ratio rises by 16% when going to 
15 The Hausman-McFadden statistic is defined as T = (OR - 0,)' [cov(OR) - 
cov(O,)]t(OR - 0), where 0,, is the coefficient vector estimated for the full model; 
0R is the coefficient vector estimates among individuals choosing a subset of the 
total choice set; cov(O) refers to the relevant parameter covariance matrix; and t 
denotes a generalized inverse. The test statistic is interpreted such that a value of 
T larger than a x2 critical value rejects IIA; degrees of freedom are computed as 
df = tr[cov(OR) - cov(O,)]t[cov(OR) - cov(O,)]. 
16 The test cannot be performed where retirement was mandatory at age 65 or 
when no worker in a particular plan chose to retire before age 62. 
17 These variations may be indicative of differences in health or nonlabor in- 
come, factors which are not reported in our data set. 
18 Only the ratios of logit coefficients are identified, not the individual ax or 13 
coefficients. 
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ordered logit. In addition, the fact that the coefficient (u) is statistically 
nonzero in eight out of 10 cases suggests that relaxing the IIA assumption 
makes a difference. 
Focusing just on the OL results, we note that the relative importance 
of income versus leisure as measured by Ox/3 varies across firms by a 
factor of about 21/2: from 0.64 in plan 3 to 1.46 in plan 9. These findings 
buttress our conclusions from the linear models: workers in all firms react 
to income and leisure opportunities in selecting retirement dates, but they 
differ across firms in the way they react to the income and leisure op- 
portunities associated with deferred retirement. 
Because OL coefficients are rather difficult o interpret directly, it is 
of interest to compute explicitly how sensitive retirement ages are to 
changes in budget set parameters. Six parametric hanges in budget sets 
are considered: (a) each worker's earnings tream is increased by 10% of 
his base (age 60) earnings amount; (b) each worker's earnings stream is 
tilted such that earnings at every age are increased by 10%; (c) the pension 
benefit at each age is increased by 10% of the age 60 amount; (d) the 
slope of the pension function is raised by 10%; (e) the social security 
benefit stream is raised by 10% of the initial amount; and (J) the slope 
of the social security function is increased by adding 10% to every year's 
benefits. Estimated coefficients from table 5 are combined with these 
alternative budget sets in order to determine how each individual would 
be likely to alter his retirement date. Changes for the group as a whole 
are obtained by summing individual changes in predicted probabilities 
for each age. 
Table 7 reports the findings for the preferred OL specification in column 
1; parallel estimates for the MNL model appear in the second column. 
A 10% increase in earned income is predicted to increase the average 
retirement age by about 0.1 years, or a little over a month. A rise in 
earnings has both income and substitution effects, and in this case, the 
substitution response appears to dominate. In contrast, raising retirement 
benefits by increasing either private pensions or social security would 
Table 7 
Predicted Responses of Retirement Ages to Changes in 
Budget Set Parameters: Logit Results 
Effect of Change in Budget Set on Mean 
Retirement Age (Years) 
10% Change in SOL Results MNL Results 
Base earnings .11 .08 
Each year's earnings .14 .10 
Base pension -.12 -.09 
Each year's pension -.08 -.06 
Base social security -.13 -.10 
Each year's social security -.06 -.05 
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lower the retirement age by a little less than a month, on average. 19 
Changing the value of early retirement benefits has a larger effect han 
altering the gain to deferring retirement, for both pensions and social 
security. This is because raising only early retirement benefits produces 
an income effect favoring more leisure consumption; raising the slope of 
the benefit stream elicits an additional substitution response in the op- 
posing direction. 
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, we find that for 
every plan, higher earnings would result in later retirement, whereas 
higher pensions or social security benefits would induce earlier retirement. 
Second, the ordered logit model provides larger estimates of behavioral 
responses to changes in income parameters, as compared to the MNL 
approach. This arises from the fact that the OL setup allows nearby 
retirement ages to be "closer" to the date initially chosen than does the 
MNL model. Consequently, when the budget constraint changes, the OL 
responses are on average 30% larger as compared to the responses esti- 
mated assuming IIA. Third, the difference that OL makes varies across 
plans; looking across the 10 plans we find less of a quantitative difference 
between OL and MNL than had been detected in our earlier work on a 
single plan. This is the only quantitative difference between our findings 
in the larger sample and earlier results. Fourth, we conclude that retire- 
ment ages are responsive to budget set parameters, but the degree of 
responsiveness is relatively small. In general, rather large changes in policy 
variables such as taxes or benefits would be required in order to elicit 
substantial changes in retirement ages.20 
V. Why Do Retirement Ages Differ across Pension Plans? 
A. Retirement Ages in 10 Plans 
In contrast to previous sections, the focus here is on retirement age 
differences across pension plans rather than across individuals. That re- 
tirement ages do differ across plans is demonstrated in table 8: the overall 
retirement age across all 10 pension plans is 63.7, but plan averages range 
from 61.8 to 65.7 years of age. Several explanations are possible: either 
the economic incentives for retirement differ systematically across plans, 
or workers' preferences for income and leisure vary systematically across 
19 Gordon and Blinder (1980) also find a greater retirement response to wages 
than to pensions and social security, though the data set they use did not contain 
as much information on benefit structures as is available here. 
20 Research investigating other data sets and policy reconfirms the small size of 
the retirement response described here (Fields and Mitchell 1983b). Evidently the 
intertemporal labor supply response parameter is comparable in size to those 
measured for similar workers in cross-section data (see, e.g., Cain and Watts 
1973) and in the life-cycle setting of Heckman and MaCurdy (1980). 
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plans, or both factors may be important. While a larger sample would 
be necessary for a thorough investigation of these explanations, it is of 
interest o explore the suggestive vidence provided by the 10 plans for 
which information is presently available. 
B. Retirement Ages and Worker Preferences 
Our earlier analysis used OL models to develop plan-specific estimates 
of the weights workers attach to income relative to leisure (L/r3). In order 
to see whether retirement ages and workers' tastes are associated across 
plans, we correlate each plan's ratio of d/r with its average retirement 
age (R).2 We find that in fact this ratio covaries with retirement age 
almost exactly, producing a correlation coefficient between R and odj of 
.94. This finding suggests that plans that have later average retirement 
ages are also those where workers on the average have stronger elative 
preferences for income versus leisure. 
C. Retirement Ages and Income Opportunities 
We now investigate whether differences in budget constraint parameters 
across plans help explain plan-level differences in retirement ages. This 
issue can be analyzed in two ways: (1) Do plans offering more income 
for early retirement have earlier average retirement ages (holding constant 
the rewards from deferring retirement)? (2) Do plans offering a greater 
reward for postponing retirement have higher average retirement ages (for 
a given early retirement benefit)? 
One way to operationalize both questions is to determine the degree 
of association between average retirement ages (R), the present value of 
Table 8 
Average Retirement Ages by Plan 
Retirement Age 
in Years 
Retirement Plan (R) 
Plan 1 63.27 
Plan 2 63.53 
Plan 3 61.82 
Plan 4 62.77 
Plan 5 64.67 
Plan 6 63.18 
Plan 7 64.71 
Plan 8 63.17 
Plan 9 65.69 
Plan 10 64.17 
Overall mean 63.70 
21 The ratio t/p3 was computed only where the underlying OL coefficients were 
statistically significant. We interpret this ratio as a measure of relative preference 
for income vs. leisure, although it may reflect worker tastes for job characteristics 
as well. 
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income available to an early retiree (YBASE), and the change in the present 
value of income if retirement is deferred until age 65 (YSLOPE). For our 
sample of plans the coefficient of partial correlation between retirement 
age and YBASE proves to be -.58, and that between retirement age and 
YSLOPE +.30. Therefore we can conclude that some of the variation 
in retirement ages across plans is attributable to differences in income 
opportunities available to workers covered by the plans, though not as 
much as was attributed to differences in worker preferences. 
D. Is There Sorting? 
Firms and workers may sort themselves according to their respective 
preferences for continued work. Firms may differ according to the pro- 
ductivity value of additional seniority: presumably older workers are less 
productive per dollar expended in some industries than they are in others. 
Such firms would be expected to create incentives for older employees 
to leave at relatively oung ages. One way to do this is to create pension 
benefits that are larger for workers who retire early. If workers are aware 
of the differential incentives offered by different employers, those indi- 
viduals who have relatively high tastes for leisure would seek employment 
in firms offering higher early retirement benefits. Empirically, this leads 
us to expect that our measure of the relative strength of worker preferences 
for income versus leisure (L/f3) should be negatively related with the 
pension plan's early retirement income level (YBASE). In fact the cor- 
relation of t/f3 and YBASE is -.45, suggesting that sorting of this type 
does indeed take place. 
VI. Conclusions and Implications 
The analysis reported here is based on a larger and richer data set than 
has been previously available to researchers tudying retirement issues. 
Of course, the sample should be expanded even further before attempting 
to generalize beyond this group of employees and pension plans, and we 
expect future research to go in this direction. The evidence developed 
thus far suggests four major findings: 
1. Older workers' income opportunities differ depending on when they 
retire, who they are, and what their pension rules are. For a given indi- 
vidual, payoffs to continued work are greater at some ages than at others; 
in general private pensions and social security appear not to be actuarially 
neutral. Even within a pension plan, income opportunities vary across 
workers as a function of seniority and salary histories used to compute 
retirement benefits. Across pension plans there are also large differences: 
in some firms, the present value of retiring early is low but rises if the 
worker defers retirement; in other firms, the structure is reversed so early 
retirement is rewarded but continued work penalized. 
2. Differences in income opportunities at older ages influence retirement 
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patterns ignificantly. Individuals with more income at age 60 retire arlier; 
however, retirement is delayed if the worker stands to gain more by 
working longer. In addition, the degree of responsiveness to income 
opportunities depends on the attractiveness of other, nearby retirement 
ages. Changes in earnings have a stronger impact on retirement patterns 
than would the same percentage change in private pension or social se- 
curity benefits. 
3. Tastes for leisure and income are not uniform either across older 
workers with a firm or across firms. The data reject a model that imposes 
IIA in favor of models which allow for within-individual taste correlation 
("workaholism"). 
4. Average retirement ages vary widely across firms; some of this vari- 
ation is attributable to differences in worker preferences, and some to 
differences in income opportunities. In addition, there is some evidence of 
worker sorting: those individuals who place a high value on work and 
the income derived from working are found in firms which provide greater 
financial rewards for remaining on the job at older ages. 
Overall, though many factors influence retirement behavior, our work 
shows that retirement patterns are closely linked to the economic incen- 
tives for dererring retirement. The policy implications of this finding are 
evident: government practices which alter the rewards for retirement will 
influence older workers' labor market behavior in predictable ways. For 
instance, reducing early social security benefits or raising the payroll tax 
(leaving all else the same) would encourage individuals to remain in the 
labor force, though our results indicate a relatively small response.22 
Future research should inquire whether differences in response patterns 
identified here are correlated with other worker and/or firm character- 
istics, such as health or job requirements. Our findings on worker sorting 
also deserve further attention in future research. Evidence presented here 
suggests that firms and workers attempt o structure their pension struc- 
tures in a mutually agreeable manner. Thus planners charged with making 
pension policy would do well to consider how specific reforms would 
alter existing structures, and to ascertain whether such reforms are in fact 
beneficial to firms and/or their employees. 
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